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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
ROBINSON V. BALTIMORE POLICE DEP'T
By: Benjamin Joffe
KNOWINGLY MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT MATERIAL
TO AND DURING AN INVESTIGATION OF PRIOR
MISCONDUCT HAS A ONE YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND, THEREFORE, CHARGES AGAINST AN
OFFICER MUST BE FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE
FALSE STATEMENT COMING TO THE ATTENTION OF
THE APPROPRIATE AGENCY.
All Recent Developments are available on the University of Baltimore
Law Forum website: http://law.ubalt.edullawforum.
Please cite this Recent Development as Robinson v. Baltimore Police
Dep't, 42 U. BaIt. L.F. 243 (2012).
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when calculating the
statute of limitations for knowingly making a false statement material
to an investigation of prior misconduct, the period begins to run on the
date the agency becomes aware that the officer made the false
statement. Robinson v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 424 Md. 41, 33 A.3d
972 (2011). The court rejected the argument that the period begins to
run on the date of the incident giving rise to the investigation, and as a
result, the appropriate law enforcement agency has one year from the
date it learns of the false statement to bring administrative charges. Id.
at 41, 33 A.3d at 972.
On February 22, 2007, a Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”)
officer arrested Teressa Houssain (“Houssain”) and charged her with
prostitution. During her arrest, Houssain told a member of the BPD
that she recently engaged in sexual intercourse with another member
of the BPD, Sergeant Steve Robinson (“Robinson”). Three days prior
to her arrest, Houssain claimed that she approached a silver SUV and a
man introduced himself as “Steve.” This man then showed her a
Baltimore City Police Identification Card with the name Robinson
printed on it and propositioned her for sex. Houssain accepted
Robinson’s proposition, and the two engaged in sexual intercourse in
the back of his vehicle in the lot of an empty Park and Ride. This
incident was referred to the Internal Investigation Division (“IID”) of
the BPD, which served Robinson with a Notification of Complaint for
engaging in sexual misconduct while on duty on February 19, 2007.
IID investigators interviewed Robinson on July 11, 2007, and again
on August 1, 2007. During both interviews, Robinson denied knowing
Houssain and denied having sexual intercourse with her. Robinson
claimed that on the date in question he was not driving the vehicle
identified by Houssain, and he provided “EZ Pass” receipts for his
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243

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 42.2

personal sedan on that date. In addition, Robinson informed IID
investigators that his supervisor instructed him to use his personal
vehicle while participating in prostitution sting operations. Robinson
also alleged that he was unfamiliar with the Park and Ride and he was
not there on the day of the alleged incident. IID investigators retrieved
video footage from security cameras located within the Park and Ride
lot and discovered that Robinson and Houssain were in a silver SUV
on February 19, 2007. Robinson’s EZ Pass receipts were found to be
fraudulent and Robinson’s supervisor informed IID investigators that
he never told Robinson to use his own vehicle.
On June 26, 2008, the BPD charged Robinson with six
administrative violations of the BPD General Orders. A BPD
charging committee, with the recommendation of IID investigators,
terminated Robinson’s employment on July 11, 2008. Robinson filed
a Complaint in conjunction with a Petition to Show Cause in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging that the one-year statute of
limitations period barred all six violations. The Circuit Court for
Baltimore City granted the BPD’s motion for summary judgment on
the false statement charge. Robinson appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in
an unreported opinion. Robinson then filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.
Robinson argued that the one-year statute of limitations period for
bringing charges related to the false statements had expired on
February 22, 2008, which was one year after Houssain’s arrest on
February 22, 2007, when the BPD learned of his misconduct.
Robinson, 424 Md. at 47-48, 33 A.3d at 976-78. In support of his
argument, Robinson cited section 3-106 of the Law Enforcement
Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”) requiring that all charges be
brought against an officer within one year after the act that gave rise to
the charges came to the attention of the agency. Id. at 47-48, 33 A.3d
at 976-77.
Alternatively, the BPD claimed the acts that gave rise to the cause
of action occurred on the dates that Robinson uttered the false
statements during his interviews, which were on July 11 and August 1,
2007. Robinson, 424 Md. at 50, 33 A.3d at 978. The BPD argued that
prior to those dates no false statements had been made, and there could
be no false statement charge prior to the IID interviews. Id. Applying
this time frame, the one-year limitations period would not expire until
July 11, 2008, which was after the June 26, 2008 charging date. Id.
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the oneyear limitations period proffered by the BPD was correct, and affirmed
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the judgment of the intermediate appellate court. Robinson, 424 Md.
at 51, 33 A.3d at 978-79. In reaching its decision the court relied on
the basic rules of statutory construction. Id. The court proceeded to
ascertain the legislative intent by examining the plain language of the
statute at issue. Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421, 2 A.3d
368, 373 (2010)). The court concluded that the plain meaning of
section 3-106 of the LEOBR was unambiguous and did not support
Robinson’s argument. Robinson, 424 Md. at 52, 33 A.3d at 979. If
the statute of limitations period was to begin on February 22, 2007, as
argued by Robinson, the text of section 3-106 would have to plainly
state the period as such. Id. at 50-51, 33 A.3d at 978. The court noted
that Robinson failed to provide any support through legislation or case
law that would indicate a reading of section 3-106 in the manner he
requested. Id. at 51, 33 A.3d at 979. The court stated that language
would have to be added to the text of section 3-106 to create a timeline
similar to what Robinson argued. Id.
The court further stated that Robinson’s interpretation of section 3106 would lead to illogical results and offered a hypothetical scenario
in support of their conclusion. Robinson, 424 Md. at 51-52, 33 A.3d
at 979. The scenario began with an officer making false statements
during an investigation into an incident that occurred eleven months
and twenty-eight days prior to the making of the false statements. Id.
IID investigators would be required to either bring charges for the
false statements during the three following days or the action would be
time barred. Id. at 52, 33 A.3d at 979. The court described this
hypothetical situation as an absurdity, and the plain meaning of section
3-106 of the LEOBR could not be read to support this argument. Id. at
51-52, 33 A.3d at 979.
The court reached its final determination after reviewing section 3113(a) of the LEOBR. Robinson, 424 Md. at 52, 33 A.3d at 979. This
section expressly prohibits BPD officers from knowingly making a
false statement material to an investigation. Id. The court determined
that the Maryland General Assembly would not intend to create an
additional statute if the making of a false statement could be charged
under section 3-106. Id. at 52-53, 33 A.3d at 979. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statute of limitations
period within section 3-106 began on the date of the first false
statement, which in this case was July 11, 2007. Id. at 53, 33 A.3d at
980. The BPD, therefore, filed the charges against Robinson for
knowingly making a false statement within the applicable period of
limitations. Id.
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In Robinson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland demonstrated its
commitment to strict principles of statutory construction by examining
the legislative intent of the Maryland General Assembly to determine
an appropriate statute of limitations period. The act of knowingly
making a false statement material to an investigation constitutes a
separate cause of action that cannot be attributed to an earlier act of
misconduct even though that conduct was under investigation when
the false statement was made. The court’s holding in Robinson serves
as a strong deterrent for similar officer misconduct, as BPD
investigators now have additional options to sanction untruthful
investigative behavior under the text of section 3-113(a).

